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Payment Scheme Self-Selection in the Credence Goods Market:  
An Experimental Study 
 
Hernan Bejarano – CIDE and Economic Science Institute, Chapman University 
Ellen P. Green – School for the Science of Healthcare Delivery, Arizona State University 
Stephen Rassenti - Economic Science Institute, Chapman University 
 
Given heterogeneity in expert behavior across payment schemes in credence 
goods markets, it becomes important to understand the consequences of 
payment scheme selection. To study the effect on customer well being of 
expert self-selection, we recruited subjects to participate in a real-effort 
credence good laboratory market. Experts were either randomly assigned or 
faced with the choice of three payment schemes: fee-for-service, salary, and 
capitation. We found that experts who selected fee-for-service payment 
resulted in customers with significantly worse outcomes in comparison with 
experts who had been randomly assigned to fee-for-service. In contrast, experts 
who selected salary payment did not change customer outcomes relative to 
those who were randomly assigned. 
 
Highlights: 
• Selection of fee-for-service and salary dominated over capitation.  
• Self-selected Fee-for-service provided significantly more edits than randomly assigned.  
• Self-selected Salary did not change the number of edits relative to randomly assigned. 
 
Keywords: 
Credence Goods, Self-Selection, Fee-for-service, Capitation, Payment, Sorting  
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1. Introduction 
The characteristic trait of a credence good market is that customers are never aware of 
whether the services they were provided were of the type or quality that they needed; they only 
observe their marginal utility of receiving those services. On the contrary, the service providers, 
i.e., experts, have better information regarding both assessment and appropriate action, 
presenting them with a nearly ideal environment to place their interests ahead of their customers’ 
(Emons 1997). For example, physicians have better information regarding the necessary 
treatments for their patients both before (considering reported symptoms) and after (accounting 
for examination and test results) an appointment. Given this informational asymmetry, traditional 
solutions for aligning customer and expert’s preferences, such as punishment and reward 
incentives, monitoring, liability, verifiability, and reputation, may not be available or effective 
(Brosig-Koch, Hennig-Schmidt et al. 2013, Dulleck and Kerschbamer 2006, Green 2014, 
Hennig-Schmidt, Selten et al. 2011). Customer well being would therefore be largely determined 
by experts’ intrinsic motivations. Understanding how monetary incentives and expert preferences 
influence sorting is of importance to employers and policy makers. Our study places subjects in a 
credence goods environment in order to examine how expert self-sorting by payment scheme 
affects customer well being. 
Our experiment builds on two independent branches of the credence-goods literature: 
payment schemes and self-selection. Research on payment schemes in credence goods markets is 
mixed. In particular, some empirical studies utilizing naturally occurring data found that expert 
behavior was independent of payment schemes (Croxson, Propper et al. 2001, Devlin and Sarma 
2008), while others found a significant change in behavior from payment schemes (Gaynor and 
Gertler 1995). The latter studies found that experts altered their actions as self-interested profit 
maximizers (Matsaganis and Glennerster 1994, Robinson 2001, Robinson, Shortell et al. 2004). 
Systematic literature reviews of payment schemes generally conclude that there is not enough 
supporting evidence to recommend policy changes (Gosden, Forland et al. 2001, Sørensen and 
Grytten 2003).  
Disparities in empirical studies are likely caused by the nature of the data. Payment 
schemes are difficult to study in context because naturally occurring data oftentimes does not 
allow the researcher to control for expert’s unobservable characteristics (e.g., altruism and risk 
aversion), distinguish between implicit and explicit incentives (e.g., wages v. promotion and 
tenure), adapt for measurement error, and finally, implement exogenous policy changes. These 
hurdles motivate laboratory experiments. Experiments can control for selection in payment 
schemes and also condition experts and customers payment functions to induce different utility 
functions (Smith 1976). Furthermore, the experimental environment isolates the relationship 
between customers and experts, allowing researchers to focus on a single question. Following 
this line of research, there is a general consensus that suggests that expert behavior is influenced 
by payment scheme. In their experimental studies, Green (2014) and Hennig-Schmidt (2011) 
both showed that experts were motivated by payment scheme as well as how their actions 
impacted their customers. In their experiments, experts deviated from their profit-maximizing 
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actions to improve their customers’ well being. However, the deviation from profit-maximizing 
behavior varied across payment schemes. Hence, even without self-selection productivity 
differentiation by payment scheme holds true (Corgnet, Hernán-González et al. 2014). 
Given disparities in actions across payment schemes, it is important to understand expert 
self-selection. Experiments on sorting have found that self-selection by payment scheme 
interacts with experts’ skills, and performance, thereby affecting productivity in labor markets 
(Cadsby, Song et al. 2007, Dohmen and Falk 2011, Macpherson, Prasad et al. 2014). More 
specifically, workers who were given the opportunity to select their payment scheme in a labor 
market were more productive with piece rate than flat rate (as expected), but another 
interpretation of this result is that piece rate payment can attract more productive workers 
(Lazear 1996). The key difference between past self-selection literature and our experiment is the 
introduction of the credence goods market. This market allows for intrinsic motivations and 
information asymmetries that may have a significant impact on expert actions. 
To elicit the effects of expert self-selection in a credence goods market, we used a 
proofreading task that was imbedded in a two treatment, two by three experimental design. 
Treatment 1 varied the assignment mechanism (self-selection or random), while Treatment 2 
varied the payment scheme (salary, capitation, or fee-for-service). Under each payment scheme, 
experts faced a moral dilemma or tradeoff between maximizing earnings and delivering 
customer-centered service. Under salary, experts faced a tradeoff between minimizing their 
effort (making fewer edits) and increasing the well being of their customers. In contrast, under 
fee-for-service, experts could maximize their payment by providing as many edits as possible, 
irrespective of their correctness or appropriateness. Finally, in capitation experts faced a tradeoff 
between maximizing the number of customers serviced by minimizing effort for each customer. 
In this way, we can observe both the expert’s preference for moral dilemma circumstances, and 
the strength of that moral dilemma as manifested by their subsequent actions.  
We found several relevant results. First, selection of fee-for-service and salary dominated 
over capitation. Secondly, on average we found no significant change in the customers’ well 
being when comparing expert’s behavior in randomly assigned with those in the self-selection 
treatment. However, disaggregating by payment scheme, we observed significant differences in 
expert actions under the fee-for-service payment scheme. More specifically, experts who selected 
fee-for-service provided significantly more edits (services) than those who were randomly 
assigned. This increase included a significant number of harmful edits made by these experts, 
while the number of beneficial edits remained constant. In comparison, experts who selected 
salary payment did not change the number of edits (beneficial or harmful) relative to those who 
were randomly assigned salary payment. Given these results, customers could expect to be better 
off when matched with salaried experts. 
To the best of our knowledge, this is the first study to investigate effects of self-selection 
by payment scheme in a credence goods market with a real effort task (see Brosig-Koch et al. for 
a chosen effort task). Credence goods markets have a particularly important impact on the 
welfare of our society. The healthcare industry alone accounted for 17.4% of our GDP in 2014  
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(Hartman, Martin et al. 2015). Hence, even small market failures, such as the overprovision of 
services, would result in large losses in customer welfare.  
 
2. The Experiment 
 
2.1. Experimental Task 
Our experimental task was first introduced in Green (2014) to study the effect of various 
physician payment schemes on physician performance. An advantage of the design is that it can 
be readily interpreted as a representation of the relationship between any expert and customer. 
Therefore, we have broadened the interpretation of Green’s dual-principal agent game to all 
credence goods markets and adopted the credence terminology throughout our paper.  
As in Green (2014), our experiment was implemented in two phases. In phase I, subjects 
were recruited to play the roles of customers. The customers proofread 10 unique essays in 50 
minutes. Each essay had 10 spelling and/or typographical errors. At the start of the session, the 
customers were endowed with $25. For each error the customers failed to identify, $0.25 was 
taken away from their initial endowment. Customers were paid according to their performance, 
however they were not informed which errors they were able to correctly identify and which 
errors remained uncorrected. After all customers completed phase I, essays from each customer 
were selected for proofreading by the experts in phase II. The customer’s lack of expertise in 
correcting the essays allowed us to endogenously generate a demand for the credence good. That 
is, each customer needed the expert’s proofreading services to recover some of their endowment 
in phase II. 
In phase II, subjects were recruited to act as experts and re-proofread the essays on behalf 
of their customers. The errors the customers were able to identify were removed from the text 
between phases I and II, which left only the errors that needed to be corrected in the essays 
presented to the experts. There were 125 errors that needed to be corrected. Each expert was 
presented with 4 rounds of essays, each round comprised of 10 essays. The essays presented to 
all experts in each round were the same, but the errors requiring editing changed from round to 
round. Experts had a maximum of 7 minutes to complete each round; however, if the expert was 
satisfied with her edits she was able to proceed to the next round before the 7 minutes were up. 
Between rounds each expert received a report of her previous round and cumulative results, 
including her number of correct edits, her number of incorrect edits and her change in aggregate 
earnings. In summary, experts were presented with 40 essays over 4 rounds with a total of 125 
errors to detect in a maximum of 28 minutes.  
 
2.2 Credence Goods Markets in the Laboratory 
Each of the 125 errors the expert needed to correct was highlighted in turquoise, but for 
each highlighted error two additional sections of text were also highlighted that did not contain 
actual errors. Therefore, 375 sections of text were highlighted in turquoise across the 40 essays, 
125 sections contained actual errors and 250 were without errors. The expert was informed of 
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this ratio, but was free to demarcate any highlighted section of text as containing an error, which 
allowed for her over-provision of services, 
Figure 1 is an excerpt from one of the essays presented to the experts in phase II. In this 
example, the customer failed to identify the spelling of the word “root” as incorrect in phase I 
(the correct spelling in this context is “route”). The other highlighted words, “was” and 
“foreign”, did not need to be amended, but were highlighted to allow the experts to provide 
unnecessary service to their customers. Note, the customer’s imbursement in phase II was 
dependent on quality, while the expert’s imbursement was dependent on quantity.  
 
Table 1: Expert and Customer Payment 
Phase I       
Customer Initially endowed with $25.00, 
decreased by $0.25 for each error left 
unidentified 
     Phase II (Randomly Assigned and Self-Selection) 
Expert 
   Fee-for-service $0.20 for each edit 
 Capitation $0.625 for each essay edited 
 Salary $25.00 at the end of the experiment 
    Customer 
   Harmful Edits $0.15 each 
  Beneficial Edits -$0.05     
 
Treatments in the experiment varied by assignment mechanism (self-selection or 
random), while Treatment 2 varied the payment scheme (salary, capitation, or fee-for-service). 
Table 1 provides a summary of the payments schemes. The self-selection treatment allowed the 
experts to select among the payment schemes used in the fee-for-service, capitation, and salary 
treatments. In the fee-for-service treatment, experts were paid $0.20 per edit to the text that they 
made, regardless of correctness. In the salary treatment, payment was independent of edits made 
to the text; experts were paid $25 to participate in the experiment. In the capitation treatment, 
experts were paid $0.625 for each essay in which they edited at least one highlighted section of 
the text, regardless of correctness. Fee-for-service and capitation parameters are set such that 
experts who provided only necessary services obtain the same earnings as those under salary.1 
                                                
1	The	payment	systems	differed	from	Green’s	dual-principal	agent	game.	In	Green	(2014)	payments	were	determined	such	that	if	subjects	behaved	in	their	customer’s	best	interest,	they	would	earn	the	same	amount	under	each	treatment.	 
Figure 1: 
The root to the stop was familiar from countless hours of riding bikes, roller-blading, 
and the like, but today, it seemed completely foreign to me. 
 Green (2014)  
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The customer’s well being was impacted by the quality of the expert’s edits in phase II. 
The impact of expert’s actions on customer well being was constant across treatments. The 
customer’s well-being decreased by $0.05 for each section of the text that was incorrectly 
amended by the expert and increased by $0.15 for each section of the text that was correctly 
amended. There was no change in the customer’s well being for sections of the text that 
remained unchanged. For instance, in example 1 above, if the expert correctly edited “root” and 
incorrectly edited “was” the payments to the customer and expert were as follows: 
● The customer would receive $0.10 ($0.15 from “root” and -$0.05 from “was”) 
● If the expert was in the salary treatment, her salary would be unaffected by the edits 
made. 
● If the expert was in the fee-for-service treatment, she would receive $0.40 for the edits 
($0.20 for each edit). 
● If the expert was in the capitation treatment, she would receive $0.625 for having made 
at least one edit (correct or not) on behalf of this customer. 
 
2.3 Implementation 
The experiment was conducted at the laboratory of the Economic Science Institute (ESI) 
at Chapman University. A total of 167 undergraduate students participated. Experimental 
sessions were conducted between May 2014 and May 2015. Essays were borrowed from Green’s 
original experiment. Essays were written by an English professor and contained errors that he 
commonly saw in his college students’ work. Once the essays were created, they were assessed 
for difficulty in a principles of microeconomics class at Virginia Tech and calibrated 
accordingly.  
  Proofreading in phase I was conducted in ESI laboratory classrooms. Following their 
task, phase I students were given the option to be partially reimbursed for their missed errors 
based on the performance of a second group of students (phase II). A total of 8 students 
participated in phase I, from which an average of 5 essays from each student were chosen to 
create the panel of 40 essays to be used across all treatments in phase II. On average subjects 
earned $13.53 from their performance in phase I.2 
A total of 159 undergraduate students participated in phase II of the experiment.3 Phase II 
was conducted at computer stations within the ESI laboratory. Students were separated into 
cubicles. Printed instructions were provided for the students to read on their own for ten minutes. 
At the end of the 10 minutes, the experiment coordinator read the same instructions out loud. 
Next, to ensure task understanding, students completed a quiz on either their assigned payment 
scheme (in treatments fee-for-service, capitation, and salary) or a quiz on all three payment 
schemes (in the self-selection treatment). After 10 minutes, the answers to the quiz were 
                                                
2Despite	multiple	attempts	by	the	authors,	a	large	majority	of	the	subjects	in	phase	I	chose	not	to	collect	their	reimbursements	from	phase	II. 
3	One	subject’s	data	was	discarded	in	our	analysis	because	she	restarted	previously	completed	proofreading. 
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evaluated. This process continued in shorter intervals until all subjects correctly answered all 
quiz questions.  
Once all subjects had answered the quizzes correctly, subjects began proofreading essays 
via the computer interface. Essays were presented in 4 rounds. Each round consisted of a panel 
of ten essays. Subjects had a maximum of 7 minutes to proofread and correct the essays in each 
round. The computer interface allowed subjects to navigate back and forth between the 10 essays 
within the round. Students did not have access to any other software in the duration of the 
experiment. However, if the students chose to do so, they could select to finish the proofreading 
task at any point in the experiment. On average, in the phase II sessions lasted 1.5 hours and 
phase II subjects earned $29.44 in addition to the $7 show up fee.  
 
Table 2: Subject Count by Experimental and Treatment Status 
Player Payment N Totals 
Customers 
 
8 8 
    Experts 
   
Randomly 
Assigned 
Capitation 25 
105 Fee-For-Service 39 
Salary 41 
    
Self-Selection 
Capitation 2 
53 Fee-For-Service 21 
Salary 30 
Total     166 
 
3. Results 
Our results are consistent with previous literature that compares the fee-for-service, 
salary, and capitation payment schemes (Green, 2014). Experts in fee-for-service provided more 
services at a lower quality than the salary and capitation payment schemes under both the self-
selection and the randomly assigned treatments. Table 2 presents the distribution of subjects 
under each treatment and payment structure. When selection was allowed, we observed that two 
payment schemes, fee-for-service, salary were preferred over capitation by the experts. We 
observed that out of 53 in the self-selection treatment, 30 (56%) chose salary, 21(42%) fee-for-
service, and 2 (3%) capitation. The remainder of this section describes our 9 key results, 
delineated by overall self-selection effects (Results 1-5) and payment scheme specific self-
selection effects (Results 6-9).  
 
Result 1: Self-selection induced a greater overall number of edits. 
 
Chart 1 demonstrates the first result of our experiment. Experts made 145.1 edits on 
average in the self-selection treatment, while only 118.4 in the randomly assigned treatments. 
This significant increase of 25% (Fligner-Policello Rank  U=-1.454   p-value = 0.07303) implies 
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that on average under self-selection experts provide more services than when they are randomly 
assigned a payment scheme. However, in our experimental design, experts who provided more 
edits did not necessarily provide a higher overall quality of service. Hence, we need to 
disaggregate edits by harmful and beneficial to better understand the overall impact of self-
selection. Here, beneficial edits are defined as those that are correct. Harmful edits can be either 
necessary but incorrectly edited or unnecessary.  
 
 
Chart	1	Beneficial	Edits	and	Harmful	Edits:	The	translucent	portion	of	the	bar	represents	harmful	edits;	the	opaque	section	of	the	bar	represents	beneficial	edits.	
Results 2: Self-selection did not affect the overall number of beneficial edits. 
 
We observe almost no difference in the average number of beneficial edits provided 
between the self-selection and randomly assigned treatments. Experts provided on average 72.2 
beneficial edits in the self-selection treatments, while those in the randomly assigned treatments 
provided 75.0 beneficial edits. The observed increase was not statistically significant (Fligner-
Policello Rank  U=0. 047  p-value = 0.48113). Hence, experts acting in self-selected payment 
schemes do not seem to increase or decrease the average number of beneficial edits provided.  
 
Result 3: Self-selection induced a greater overall number of harmful edits. 
 
Experts in the self-selection treatment provided an average of 73.0 harmful edits, while 
those who were randomly assigned  provided only 43.4 harmful edits. This constituted a 
significant increase of 68% in the average number of harmful edits (Fligner-Policello Rank  U=-
1.405   p-value =0.07997). In light of Result 1, we see experts who self-select increase the 
number of edits provided relative to experts randomly assigned, but Results 2 and 3 indicate that 
this difference is driven by an increase in harmful rather than beneficial edits.   
 
Result 4:  Self-selection did not affect the overall impact on the customer’s well being. 
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In our experimental design, the customer’s payoff or well being is affected by the quality 
of the expert’s edits, both harmful and beneficial. Almost no difference was observed in average 
customer well being across the self-selection and randomly assigned treatments. The randomly-
assigned experts increased their customers’ well being by $9.08 on average. This was larger but 
not statistically different than self-selection experts who increased their customer’s well being by 
$7.18 on average (Fligner-Policello Rank  U=0.655  p-value =0.25630). 
 
We evaluate expert effort in two ways: 1) The net impact on customer well being as calculated 
by payoff generated by the parameters of the experiment, or 2) The ratio of beneficial-to-total 
edits. The latter criterion simultaneously evaluates both quantity of edits provided and the 
characteristics of the edits (i.e., beneficial or harmful), and seems to provide a more 
representative measure of the expert’s actions in the proofreading task. 
 
Result 5: Self-selection did not affect the overall ratio of beneficial-to-total edits. 
 
Aggregating across all payment schemes, we did not observe a significant difference 
between the ratios of beneficial-to-total edits which were 0.70 for self-selection experts and 0.78 
for randomly assigned experts (Fligner-Policello Rank U=-1.049 p-value =0.14700).  
 
Results 1-5 summarize the effects that the self-selection treatment had on the overall provision of 
the credence goods. The following 5 results isolate the effects that the self-selection treatment 
had on the performance within the fee-for-service and salary payment schemes.4  Table 3 reports 
Fligner-Policello rank comparisons between randomly assigned experts and self-selection 
experts by payment scheme.  
 
Result 6: Self-selection did not affect the number of beneficial edits under salary or fee-for-
service. 
 
Consistent with Result 2, the average number of beneficial edits provided by experts who 
selected either fee-for-service or salary payment schemes was not significantly different than the 
number provided by experts randomly assigned to these payment schemes. This result is not 
surprising given that none of the payment schemes increased experts’ earnings with beneficial 
edits. Table 3 row 2 presents the mean number of beneficial edits under each payment scheme 
disaggregated by the self-selection and the randomly assigned treatments. The average number 
of beneficial edits under the fee-for-service payment scheme in the self-selection treatment is 
smaller than in randomly assigned experts (68.4 and 77.8, respectively); the opposite is true 
under salary (74.9 and 77.5, respectively). However, neither of these differences in statistically 
significant.  
                                                
4 Only two experts in the self-selection treatment chose the capitation payment scheme, therefore, we were unable to 
explore the effects sorting had on this payment structure. 
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Table 3: Experimental Results by Payment Scheme and Assignment Mechanism 
 
Fee-for-service 
 
Salary 
 
Randomly 
Assigned 
Self-
Selection 
Fligner-
Policello   
Randomly 
Assigned 
Self-
Selection 
Fligner-
Policello 
1. Total Edited   
   
    
Mean 175.8 238.2 0.02042 
 
81.7 84.6 0.25562 
SD (106.1) (119.8) 
  
(29.4) (30.6) 
 Median 123.0 283.0 
  
88.0 95.5 
 
  
  
   
  
 2. Beneficial (B)   
   
  
 Mean 77.8 68.4 0.19464 
 
74.5 74.9 0.35581 
SD (28.8) (36.3) 
  
(27.9) (32.1) 
 Median 88.0 74.0 
  
81.0 83.5 
 
  
  
   
  
 3.Harmful 
 
  
   
  
 Mean 98.1 169.8 0.00490 
 
7.2 9.7 0.17335 
SD (123.2) (144.3) 
  
(4.9) (11.2) 
 Median 23.0 178.0 
  
6.0 7.5 
 
  
  
   
  
 4. Impact 
 
  
   
  
 Mean $6.80  $1.80  0.04225 
 
$10.80  $10.70  0.37561 
SD (9.6) (11.8) 
  
(4.1) (5.0) 
 Median 10.7 6.9 
  
11.8 12.2 
 
  
  
   
  
 5. Beneficial/Total
Edited   
   
  
 Mean 0.56 0.40 0.00900 
 
0.90 0.90 0.44783 
SD (0.3) (0.3) 
  
(0.1) (0.2) 
 Median 0.80 0.40 
  
0.90 0.90 
 
  
  
   
  
 N 39 21 
  
41 30 
                 
Data reported describes the sum of variable over the four rounds. 
Fligner-Policello tests the hypothesis that the randomly assigned and self-selected medians 
are the same within payment schemes. P-values are reported. 
 
Result 7: Self-selection did not affect the number of harmful edits under Salary, but self-selection 
increased the number of harmful edits under fee-for-service. 
 
In Result 3, we noted that the increase in edits in the self-selection treatment was largely 
driven by the increase in number of harmful edits provided. Table 3 row 3 reports the average 
number of harmful edits provided by payment scheme. Here we see that experts who selected 
fee-for-service provided on average 73% more harmful edits than experts randomly assigned to 
this payment scheme. In contrast, experts who selected salary payment did not significantly 
change the number of harmful edits produced compared with experts who were randomly 
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assigned. Hence, the increase in harmful edits observed in the self-selection treatment is driven 
by harmful edits made by those who selected fee-for-service payment. 
 
 
Chart	2	Beneficial	Edits	and	Harmful	Edits	by	Payment:	The	translucent	portion	of	the	bar	represents	harmful	edits;	the	opaque	section	of	the	bar	represents	beneficial	edits.	
Result 8: Self-selection did not affect the expert’s impact on the customer’s well being in the 
salary payment scheme, but self-selection did negatively impact the customer’s well being under 
the fee-for-service treatment. 
 
Table 3 row 5 reports that an expert who selected salary payment would provide 
approximately $5 more benefit to a customer than an expert who selected fee-for-service 
payment. This can also be seen in Chart 2, which uses a bar chart to show the number of harmful 
and beneficial edits made by experts who were assigned or selected salary payment. Result 4 
indicated that self-selection did not significantly increase or decrease the customers’ expected 
well being. This means that a customer who randomly chose an expert could expect a similar 
outcome whether the expert was assigned a payment scheme or selected it herself. In spite of 
this, Results 7 and 8 reveal that knowing whether the payment scheme of her expert was 
assigned or self-selected provides valuable information to the customer. In general, a customer’s 
expected well being is higher with experts paid via salary than fee-for-service; however, under 
self-selection this distinction is even greater. 
 
 Result 9: Self-selection did not affect the ratio of beneficial-to-total edits under salary payment, 
but self-selection did affect the ratio of beneficial-to-total edits under fee-for-service payment. 
 
Our analysis of the ratio of beneficial-to-total edits yields two interesting findings shown 
in Row 5 of Table 3 and Chart 3. Chart 3 reports the number of edits that were beneficial and 
harmful disaggregated by payment scheme. The average ratio of beneficial-to-total edits is 
greater for salary than for fee-for-service payment. The average ratio of beneficial-to-total edits 
for experts paid by salary is 0.90, in both the self-selection and the randomly assigned treatment. 
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However, the average ratio of beneficial-to-total edits under fee-for-service payment is 0.56 for 
randomly assigned experts which is significantly different than 0.40 for self-selection experts 
(Fligner-Policello Rank U=0.009 p-value =.0090). Row 5 Table 3 shows that while the 
introduction of self-selection did not affect the average ratio of beneficial-to-total edits for 
experts on salary, it does seem to drive experts paid by fee-for-service to provide a lower ratio of 
beneficial-to-total edits. 
 
  
Chart	3	Percentage	Beneficial	and	Harmful	Edits	by	Payment:	The	translucent	portion	of	the	bar	represents	harmful	edits;	the	opaque	section	of	the	bar	represents	beneficial	edits.	
5. Conclusions 
In our experiment experts were either randomly assigned or allowed to select their 
payment scheme in a credence goods market. Selection is a fundamental characteristic of the 
labor market and has been investigated in traditional industries (Cadsby, Song et al. 2007, 
Dohmen and Falk 2011, Macpherson, Prasad et al. 2014), but ours is the first real effort 
experimental study to investigate selection in the credence good environment. Our experiment 
reveals the importance of incorporating self-selection into credence goods models, as it impacted 
expert’s actions and thereby customer outcomes under the two most selected payment schemes, 
fee-for-service and salary. More specifically, experts who selected fee-for-service payment 
provided more harmful edits than those who selected into salary or those who were randomly 
assigned to fee-for-service. This resulted in lower customer well being and a lower ratio of 
beneficial-to-total edits. Hence, self-selection exacerbated the asymmetric information problems 
inherent to the credence goods market in the fee-for-service payment scheme. Conversely, 
selection had no significant impact on expert behavior under the salary payment scheme.  
These findings and experimental design provide a solid foundation for future studies to 
test external validity and robustness across different credence goods environments. For instance, 
in our experiment, experts were constrained to choose between different payment schemes, but 
were not able to enter different markets (i.e., different professions). In contrast, in naturally 
occurring credence markets experts have outside options and hence, selection out of a profession 
may occur due to an interaction between payment scheme and profession. That is, the subset of 
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future experts in a profession may be dependent on profession preference, payment schemes 
present, and ability to select among them. Future experiments should provide outside options for 
experimental experts to address the effects of self-selection on the formation of expert subgroups 
and the resulting behavior. If the finding is robust to different experimental parameters and 
environments, it could mean that a credence good customer would benefit from knowing both 
her expert’s payment scheme and how her expert’s position was obtained (i.e., through selection 
and matching mechanisms). Furthermore, knowing that self-selection may directly influence an 
expert’s profession of choice is an important finding for employers and policy makers designing 
rules that influence the number and characteristics of doctors in hospitals, teachers in schools, 
and other experts to their profession.  
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